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University College, Oxford  
Abstract: 
 Dispositions can combine as vector sums. Recent authors on 
dispositions, such as George Molnar and Stephen Mumford, have 
responded to this feature of dispositions by introducing a distinction 
between effects and contributions to effects, and by identifying 
disposition-manifestations with the latter. But some have been sceptical 
of the reality or knowability of component vectors; Jennifer McKitrick 
(forthcoming) presses these concerns against the conception of 
manifestations as contributions to effects. In this paper, I aim to respond 
to McKitrick’s arguments and to defend the metaphysical and 
epistemological propriety of component vectors. My strategy appeals to 
varying kinematic frames of reference. By transforming to the 
appropriate non‐inertial frame, component acceleration vectors can be 
transformed into resultant acceleration vectors, and in such frames they 
become directly observable. Being a component acceleration vector and 
being a resultant acceleration vector are both frame‐dependent properties 
of properties; they are not to be thought of as intrinsic or fundamental 
properties of an acceleration vector, but as artefacts of our frame-
dependent notation for representing vector quantities. To conclude the 
paper, I defend the view proposed against two styles of objection. The 
first objection resurrects scepticism about component vectors as 
scepticism about fundamental component vectors. The second objection 
questions the need for reference frames in the explanation by invoking a 




 Almost every familiar event results from the combined activity of 
multiple dispositions. Simply standing up involves the disposition of many 
different muscles to exert forces on different parts of my skeleton, the Earth’s 
disposition to attract me gravitationally, the ground’s disposition to resist 
compression, and other lesser contributions such as air pressure. It is perhaps an 
open empirical question whether it is possible to isolate particular microscopic 
processes from all interfering factors in specific laboratory conditions; but even if 
it turns out to be possible to do so in special cases, such conditions are highly 
atypical. 
 
 This straightforward observation has 
consequences for the metaphysics and 
epistemology of disposition manifestations. An 
orthodox view has it that dispositions are 
individuated at least in part1 by their 
manifestations; a particular force is a disposition 
to accelerate a mass at some particular rate in 
some particular direction, for example. But where 
two forces act together, the combined effect is an 
acceleration different from that which would have 
been produced by either force acting alone. 
Consider the case, described by Molnar (2003, p. 
195) of a boat pulled along a canal by two horses, 
one on either side of the canal (see Figure 1). 
Each horse exerts a force at an angle to the canal, 
but the direction in which the boat accelerates is 
straight along the canal. In such a case, the 
activity of each disposition is partially ‘masked’ by the activity of the other. The 
resultant force exerted on the boat is the vector sum of the two component 
forces exerted by the two horses, and the resultant acceleration of the boat is the 
vector sum of the component accelerations produced by each component force. 
In what sense, then, are the component forces and component accelerations 
‘manifestations’, if only the resultant force and the resultant acceleration are 
‘manifest’? 
 
 Some recent authors on dispositions have responded to this feature of 
dispositions by introducing a distinction between manifestations and effects. 
Here is George Molnar: 
 
...we must sharply distinguish between effects and manifestations... 
Effects, that is, occurrences which have causes, are not isomorphic 
                                            





with the exercise of powers, considered distributively. A manifestation 
is typically a contribution to an effect, an effect is typically a 
combination of contributory manifestations. In other words, events are 
usually related as effects to a collection of interacting powers. 
Molnar 2003, p.195 
 
Stephen Mumford has also recently committed himself to this distinction: 
 
This means that we cannot say simply that each event is a result of a 
power manifesting itself. Instead, we have to accept that events are 
polygenic, to use Molnar’s term. They are produced by many powers 
working together, or against each other, with small additive, 
sometimes subtractive, effects. 
Mumford 2009, p.104 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I will stick to Molnar’s terminology, using 
the term ‘effect’ for particular events which are the outcome of a process 
involving dispositions2, and using the term ‘contribution’ for a disposition’s role 
in producing an effect.  
 
 Some philosophers have been suspicious of the sort of distinction 
introduced by Mumford and Molnar, primarily because they are sceptical about 
the reality of ‘contributions’.  Nancy Cartwright argues as follows: 
 
The vector addition story is, I admit, a nice one. But it is just a 
metaphor. We add forces (or the numbers that represent forces) when 
we do calculations. Nature does not ‘add’ forces. For the component 
forces are not there, in any but a metaphorical sense, to be added; and 
the laws that say they are there must also be given a metaphorical 
reading. 
Cartwright 1983, p.59 
 
In a different context, Fodor and McLaughlin voice a similar scepticism: 
 
When a tensor product vector or superposition vector is tokened, its 
components are not (except per accidens)... the components of tensor 
product and superposition vectors can have no causal status as such. 
What is merely imaginary can’t make things happen, to put the point 
in a nutshell. 
Fodor & McLaughlin 1990, p.345 
                                            
2 Here I am ignoring the distinction between states and events. A house continuing 
to stand because its internal forces are balanced will be counted as an event, and 
hence as an effect of the balanced forces. There are further tricky questions about 
the individuation of effects, such as their spatio-temporal extent, which I cannot 
engage with here. But, roughly speaking, I take an effect to be ‘everything going on 




In these passages, Fodor, McLaughlin and Cartwright are expressing a 
metaphysical thesis: that component vectors (also called virtual vectors) are 
merely calculational devices and have no reality per se. This thesis should be of 
concern to anyone who believes both that manifestations should be distinguished 
from effects, and that dispositions are individuated by their manifestations. If 
manifestations are ‘merely imaginary’, doesn’t it follow that dispositions 
individuated by them are equally imaginary? And if all we can observe are 
overall effects, aren’t manifestations (thought of as contributions to effects) 
necessarily unknowable? 
 
 Jennifer McKitrick (forthcoming) presses these concerns against the 
conception of manifestations as contributions, using them to motivate a 
conception of dispositions where manifestations are identified directly with 
resultant events. In this paper, I aim to respond to McKitrick’s arguments 
against the Mumford/Molnar distinction between manifestations and events by 
defending the metaphysical and epistemological propriety of component vectors. 
This requires a characterization of component vectors which can underwrite their 
reality and their knowability.  
 
 Before we come to my account of component vectors, I first want to 
note an ineffectual response to the epistemological concern. This response is that, 
in certain scenarios, certain component vectors can be directly observed. We 
certainly feel the push of the wind when we walk in a gale, even though we can 
resist this push and not fall over. The push of the wind is not the overall effect 
of the forces involved; it is a contribution to the effect, and is counteracted by 
our own efforts. The overall effect is our remaining on our feet. It seems 
plausible that what we are feeling when we feel the wind is a component vector, 
and hence that such effects can after all be observed. The line of thought here is 
similar to the idea that we can observe singular causation directly. 
 
 The appeal to direct perception cannot be a general recipe for avoiding 
the epistemological problem. Clearly, it is of no help with the case of the horses 
and the barge, since we cannot perceive directly the forces in the ropes. Nor is it 
of any help when it comes to microphysical component forces. No-one is likely to 
say that we can observe directly the gravitational forces exerted on one proton 
by a distant pair of protons; but this kind of interaction is a paradigm example 
of the combination of component vectors. If we have to accept component 
vectors into our ontology at all, we will have to accept microphysical 
unobservable component vectors as well as the more homely and potentially 





 Despite the failure of the response which invokes direct perception, I 
don’t think the epistemological line of argument against component vectors is in 
the end a convincing one. Although they are not (in general) directly observable, 
we can nevertheless postulate an inferential route, using familiar methods, to 
knowledge of component vectors. In the simple case of the horses and the boat, 
we could cut one of the ropes and observe the boat’s resulting acceleration. We 
could then recreate the original situation, cut the other rope, and again observe 
the boat’s resulting acceleration. Simple physics tells us that the resultant vector 
in each modified case is equal in direction and magnitude to one of the 
component vectors in the original case. Thus, even though we are not able to 
directly observe either component vector, we can still have good inferential 
reason to believe that each takes a particular value. 
 
 This epistemic situation is not at all a peculiar one. The postulation of 
component vectors is justified in the same sort of way as the postulation of 
unobservable theoretical entities like quarks, and we have the same kind of 
epistemological access to them as we do to these other unobservable entities. In 
complex cases, the procedures required to investigate particular component 
vectors may be more difficult than the procedure described for the simple case of 
the horses, of physically removing one factor and observing the resultant 
behaviour; in many cases, it will not be practical or even physically possible to 
remove certain other factors. However, such problems are endemic within 
scientific methodology and we have developed a battery of inferential techniques 
to help avoid them (for example, statistical methods and the use of independent 
convergent sources of evidence). So it looks like we can postulate a familiar 
inferential route to knowledge of component vectors, perhaps combined with 
non-inferential knowledge of a macroscopic subset. I take it that this line of 
thought defuses the epistemological objection. 
 
 However, dealing in this way with the epistemological problem does not 
help with the metaphysical problem. Indeed, the account of the epistemology of 
component vectors given above apparently relies on some prior solution to the 
metaphysical problem; a convincing argument that component vectors are 
merely imaginary would block the kind of inference to the best explanation 
required for an inferential route to knowledge of them. Mumford and Molnar 
give us no clear account of what kind of thing they take component vectors to 
be. And component vectors do have unusual properties: they must always occur 
along with at least one other component vector, for example. Perhaps component 
vectors are simply too bizarre and unworldly to be admitted into our ontology.  
 
 The main project of this paper is to give a characterization of 
component vectors which will allow defenders of the distinction between 
contributions and effects to respond to the metaphysical problem. The plan is to 
do so by appeal to varying frames of reference. The notion of a frame of 
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reference employed here is familiar from elementary kinematics: in the frame of 
reference of a train, a seated passenger is motionless, but in the frame of 
reference of a station through which the train is passing at a constant velocity, a 
seated passenger is moving at the same constant velocity as the train. 
 
 In the context of classical mechanics and special relativity, reference 
frames come in two varieties; inertial and non-inertial. To a good approximation, 
the surface of the earth constitutes an inertial frame; that is, it is a frame within 
which the laws of electrodynamics (and hence the laws of classical mechanics) 
take their simplest form3. The set of inertial frames is one of the fundamental 
structural features of the theory of special relativity, and of classical mechanics 
in the neo-Newtonian spacetime formulation4. 
 
 A non-inertial frame is a frame which is not moving with constant 
velocity with respect to an inertial frame. The frame of an accelerating car 
constitutes a non-inertial frame; objects in such frames experience ‘pseudo-
forces’, such as the felt force pressing you back into your seat as a car moves off, 
or the ‘centrifugal force’ swinging you sideways as the car turns a corner. While 
the laws of electrodynamics and classical mechanics do not take their simplest 
form in non-inertial frames, such frames are nevertheless perfectly physically 
well-defined: there is an objective fact of the matter about whether a particular 
frame is non-inertial or not, and about which pseudo-forces would be experienced 
by objects from the perspective of such frames. 
 
 Non-inertial frames give us the resources to characterize the component 
vectors at work in the boat case. Instead of considering accelerations in the 
inertial frame of reference of the canal, we can evaluate the accelerations in the 
non-inertial frame of reference which is itself accelerating in the direction of the 
force applied along the left-hand rope, with an acceleration equal to the 
component acceleration of the boat in that direction. In this special non-inertial 
frame of reference, there is no acceleration at all of the boat in the direction of 
the force applied by the left-hand horse. Instead, there is only an acceleration of 
the boat in the direction of the force applied by the right-hand horse, with the 
same magnitude as the acceleration that the right-hand horse would have caused 
the boat to undergo in the absence of the left-hand horse. 
 
 What this means is that, when we move to some particular non-inertial 
frame, what was a component acceleration vector in the original frame (a 
contribution) becomes a resultant acceleration vector (an effect) in the new 
frame. By transforming to the appropriate non-inertial frame, component 
acceleration vectors can be transformed into resultant acceleration vectors, and 
                                            
3 This characterization, and the account to follow, excludes complications due to 
general relativity. 
4 For an account of neo-Newtonian spacetime, see Earman 1989, ch.2. 
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in such frames they become directly observable. This undercuts McKitrick’s 
metaphysical argument against component acceleration vectors; in the right 
reference frame, we can give a positive account of component acceleration 
vectors, as simply identical to resultant acceleration vectors. This provides a 
positive account both of component accelerations and of component forces, where 
the latter are identified as dispositions to produce component accelerations. 
 
 The account straightforwardly generalizes to cases involving more than 
two component acceleration vectors. The appropriate frame to use in isolating a 
particular component acceleration vector will not now be identified by 
consideration only of a single other acceleration vector, but rather the 
appropriate frame can be identified by consideration of the vector sum of all the 
other acceleration vectors involved in the interaction. In the frame of reference 
which is accelerating along with this vector sum, the remaining component 
acceleration vector which we are interested in will become directly observable. 
 
 It may be helpful to think of the account I am giving in the following 
terms: being a component acceleration vector and being a resultant acceleration 
vector are both frame-dependent properties of properties. The very same 
property will appear to be a resultant acceleration vector in one frame, and a 
component acceleration vector in others. It follows that the distinction between 
component and resultant acceleration vectors cannot support the ontological 
weight placed on it by sceptics about contributions; if we accept the reality of 
resultant vectors but not of component vectors, then what exists becomes a 
frame-dependent matter. 
 
 In a sense, then, I am in agreement with those who doubt the existence 
of component vectors where such vectors are conceived of as being intrinsically 
component vectors, or as being component vectors simpliciter. ‘Componentity’ 
and ‘resultantity’ are not to be thought of as intrinsic or fundamental properties 
of an acceleration vector; instead, they are to be thought of as artefacts of our 
system for representing vectors. Accordingly, a covariant notation for 
representing acceleration vectors (that is, a notation which is tied to no 
particular co-ordinate system and hence to no particular reference frame) leaves 
no room for a distinction between component acceleration vectors and resultant 
acceleration vectors. 
 
 Perhaps those who are sceptical about component vectors will complain 
that this misses the point of their objection. They could try to reformulate the 
worry by appealing to the distinction between sparse (or fundamental) and 
abundant (or derivative) properties, and claiming only that component vectors 
are not among the sparse properties. Maybe, once we take the distinction into 
account, the problem I have been considering can be dissolved as follows. 
Component vectors might not feature among the sparse properties, because the 
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sparse properties consist only of (say) scalar field values at points. But, the 
objection might run, we can construct any abundant properties we like; so 
component vectors will certainly feature among the abundant properties. Does 
the question I have been considering stem from failing to distinguish between 
two questions, each of which has an unproblematic answer? 
 
 The first thing to note is that many common examples of supposedly 
dubious component vectors are firmly planted in the abundant, or derivative, 
level of properties. It is obvious that the forces and accelerations involved in the 
example of the horses and the barge will not correspond to any sparse property. 
But even if these vectors are not perfectly natural, they are still relatively 
natural; they play important roles in high-level scientific generalizations, and are 
not gerrymandered. It is also worth noting that most examples of resultant 
vectors are also non-fundamental, which provides further reason to think that 
the distinction between component and resultant vectors cannot be assimilated 
to the distinction between abundant and sparse properties. 
 
 Once this much is established, the part of the objection that remains is a 
charge of triviality. Won’t a believer in abundant properties believe in 
component vectors simply by virtue of believing in every possible property? But 
this complaint misses the mark. A believer in abundant properties will certainly 
believe in resultant vector properties with all possible magnitudes and all 
possible directions (albeit not all of them instantiated). But this does not require 
them to believe in component vectors with all possible magnitudes and all 
possible directions5. I am therefore not too worried about any potential dilemma 
stemming from the abundant/sparse distinction. My question is not: are 
component vectors elements of the fundamental furniture of the universe? 
Rather, I am interested in the following question: are component vectors 
elements of the furniture of the universe, whether fundamental or derivative? 
 
 Another objection might question the need to bring reference frames into 
the explanation of component vectors. Someone might try to identify component 
acceleration vectors with counterfactual properties concerning accelerations: 
perhaps they are given by the accelerations which would be the resultant effect 
of an interaction if other component acceleration vectors were absent. The 
epistemology associated with this suggestion would work out in the same sort of 
way as the epistemology associated with the reference-frame suggestion. But I 
have three reasons for wanting to avoid the appeal to merely possible 
accelerations. Firstly, many people would be suspicious of properties which are 
                                            
5 Indeed, if ‘componentity’ is being thought of as intrinsic to vectors, the notion of a 
component vector is an impossible one; and then a commitment to abundant 
properties might not buy us a commitment to component vectors. I would like to 
remain neutral on whether being intrinsically a component vector expresses an 
uninstantiated property, or fails to express a property at all. 
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characterized counterfactually. It would be best to leave contentious issues in 
modal metaphysics out of an account of component vectors. Secondly, it is not 
clear that the counterfactuals by which vectors would be characterized will 
always behave as we would like them to. In many cases it might be physically 
impossible to remove all of the component accelerations in a given situation; the 
physical impossibility of unconfined quarks might well provide such a case. The 
counterfactual supposition ‘were other component vectors absent’ would then 
require for its assessment the consideration of worlds with different physical 
laws. This sort of ‘counterlegal’ counterfactual supposition presents complications 
for various views of counterfactuals, in particular dispositional essentialist views 
which hold (roughly) that the laws governing a particular property are essential 
to it. Finally, it is unclear how the counterfactual account should incorporate the 
undeniable frame-dependence of accelerations and velocities, while the reference-
frame account builds in this frame-dependence in a natural way. However, if you 
are unworried by any of these concerns, then the counterfactual account of 
component vectors will comprise an appealing alternative to the account 
developed in this paper. 
 
 One advantage that the counterfactual account does have is that it 
applies directly to all types of component vector. The reference-frame account 
has so far been given in terms of dispositions whose manifestations are 
accelerations6, and it generalizes straightforwardly to component forces (thought 
of as dispositions to produce accelerations) and component velocities (thought of 
as dispositions to change position.) What about other kinds of component 
vectors? Although many common examples of dispositions are manifested 
directly in forces or changes in motion, some instead are manifested in intrinsic 
changes in objects.  One important case is that of a room which is being 
simultaneously heated by an electric radiator and cooled by an air-conditioning 
unit. The change due to each machine can be represented as a vector in the 
thermodynamic state space of the air in the room; and the total change in 
thermodynamic state of the air is the vector sum of the two vectors. 
 
 In the thermodynamic case, there are no alternative reference frames to 
which we can transform in order to isolate each particular effect. Although the 
metaphysical status of component forces, component accelerations and 
component velocities is illuminated by considering transformations to non-
inertial frames, this trick does not appear to shed any light on the status of 
component thermodynamic changes. Does this mean that the manifestations of 
                                            
6 Of course, individual dispositions can still be manifested in accelerations even when 
the whole system is not accelerating at all in the most natural reference frame. A 
familiar example of this is when the forces on different parts of a house are balanced, 
and the house does not collapse. No overall acceleration of the house takes place in 
the reference frame of the earth, but all the forces involved are still being manifested 
as component accelerations. 
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dispositions to heat a room, which are in fact counteracted by the manifestations 
of dispositions to cool the room, are metaphysically mysterious in a way that 
manifestations of dispositions to accelerate a boat are not? 
 
 It should be borne in mind that equilibrium thermodynamics is a theory 
of high-level emergent phenomena, which can in large part be given a reductive 
explanation by reference to statistical mechanics. Statistical mechanics itself is 
based on forces, velocities, and accelerations as primitive quantities (as well as 
positions); and the status of component forces, component velocities and 
component accelerations seems unproblematic. It is therefore open to us to 
identify the ‘component heating’ and ‘component cooling’ of the room as complex 
combinations of component accelerations and component decelerations of the gas 
particles in the room. We will not in general be able to identify which complex 
combination of accelerations and decelerations corresponds to some particular 
component heating or component cooling; however, this is no more than a 
corollary of our general inability in statistical mechanics to know the exact 
micro-state a given system is in, even when we know its exact macro-state. 
 
 A similar policy, of reducing intrinsic changes to complex combinations 
of accelerations and changes in relative position, will frequently work to give 
reductive accounts of dispositions whose manifestations involve intrinsic change. 
If either classical mechanics or special relativity were part of the true and 
complete fundamental theory, then this would in fact comprise a complete 
account of disposition-manifestations: all phenomena could be reduced to forces, 
accelerations, velocities and positions, in accordance with the mechanist vision. 
However, we know that this is not the case: quantum mechanics and general 
relativity each point the way to a breakdown of classical mechanics and special 
relativity, and they involve fundamental new vector quantities in unfamiliar new 
vector spaces. Nothing I have said is intended to apply to these novel vector 
quantities. However, whatever we end up discovering about quantum mechanics 
and general relativity, we know in advance that classical mechanics and special 
relativity must be recoverable as approximations; indeed, as approximations 
which are extremely accurate over a wide range of familiar macroscopic 
phenomena. Thus we ought to be able to identify elements from the underlying 
theory which correspond approximately to velocities, forces, and accelerations; 
and then we will in principle be able to give an account of component velocities, 
forces, and accelerations in these terms. 
 
 To reiterate a point made earlier, my question is not whether there are 
any component vectors at the ‘fundamental level’ of reality. The question I am 
concerned with is a much more straightforward one, which needs no recourse to 
fundamental physics. Can we give a positive characterization of component 
vectors which can vindicate the distinction between manifestations and effects? I 
have suggested the following response: at least for straightforward macroscopic 
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dispositions, we can give a metaphysical picture which underwrites the account 
of manifestations as contributions to effects. Component vectors in some 
reference frames are resultant vectors in another frame; contributions in some 
frames are effects in another frame. McKitrick’s defence of manifestations as 
effects amounted to a pair of arguments against the component vectors picture; 
and these arguments are inconclusive in a range of central cases, a range 
covering all the main examples found in the dispositions literature. We can get 
epistemological access to this important class of component vectors through 
standard scientific inferential procedures, and we can identify them directly with 
resultant physical quantities by making use of varying frames of reference. My 
conclusion is that the Mumford/Molnar conception of manifestations as 
contributions can be given a solid epistemological and metaphysical foundation*. 
                                            
* Thanks to Frank Arntzenius, Antony Eagle, John Hawthorne, Jennifer McKitrick 
and Barbara Vetter for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, which was written 
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